Belarus

This article provides an analysis of the socio-economic background to the protests, the social and class composition of the protesters (and of those who did not take part) and the 'contradictions within the Belarusian "power elite".  It was written whilst the protests were still taking place.

Kascian explain how a new law to prevent the rehabilitation of Nazism is designed as part of the campaign to suppress Belarus civil society.

Tips for diplomats on how they can more effectively support local pro-democracy g roups facing repressive regimes. Case studies from South Africa, Ukraine, Chile, Belarus, Burma/Myanamar, Sierra Leone, Tanzania and Zimbabwe.

Mudrov, an academic working inside Belarus, argues that despite the initial impetus of the movement against Lukashenko from August 2020, there were four main reasons why it failed. The degree of support for Lukashenko was underestimated, some social classes such as industrial and agricultural workers were not well represented in the protests, government institutions consolidated behind the government and the police and military stayed loyal to the regime. Other factors were that protest symbols alienated many people, and many were deterred by the harshness of the repression. Mudrov also argues that the protests exacerbated divisions in Belarusian society, and increased hatred and distrust.  But he concludes that there is also, especially amongst the young, increasing desire for change.

A journalist's eyewitness account of  the uprising in Belarus from 4 August to 2 September, covering major demonstrations, strikes and the brutal regime response in Minsk and other parts of the country.

See also: Way, Lucan Ahmad, 'Belarus Uprising: How a Dictator Became Vulnerable', Journal of Democracy, vol. 31 no. 4. (October 2020), pp.17-27.

The author examines the mass popular response to the fraudulent presidential election, and  clarifies how the protests differ from earlier 'colour revolutions', with leaders stressing  not changes in foreign policy but free and democratic elections and constitutional government.  He suggests that even if the uprising fails it shows that Lukashenko is vulnerable to popular challenge.

Examines presidential election of March 2006 and argues that, although the protests against abuses apparently failed, they created a ‘network of solidarity’ and a ‘revolution of the spirit’. Two essays by Silitski focus on the effectiveness of the authoritarian regime and why it can contain protest are:
, Pre-empting Democracy: The Case of Belarus Journal of Democracy, 2005, pp. 83-97 , and
, Contagion Deterred: Pre-emptive Authoritarianism in the Former Soviet Union (the Case of Belarus) In Bunce; McFaul; Stoner-Weiss, Democracy and Authoritarianism in the Postcommunist World (D. II.1. Comparative Assessments)New York, Cambridge University Press, 2009, pp. 274-299 .

This article, incorporating an interview with Tikhanovskya, the leader of the opposition to the Lukashenko regime in exile, provides a useful summary of the resistance to the rigged election in 2020 and the subsequent repression. Vock notes the ruthlessness of Lukashenko against the opposition internally and those in exile in EU countries, and his unscrupulous use of refugees from  the Middle East  to challenge the Polish/EU borders. He also indicates that the Belarus opposition, which initially did not challenge ties to Russia, has become explicitly hostile to Putin's backing for Lukashenko and more dependent on EU and western support. Vok also reports that a leaked poll from inside Belarus indicates that although Tikhanovskya has significant support, two of the jailed opponents of the regime, Babaryko and Kolesnikova, are more highly regarded. 

Covers earlier Belarusian history and search for identity, but gives weight to analysis of President Lukashenka’s rise to power and how he maintained it effectively for so long, including his handling of the challenge in the 2010 presidential election.