Explaining the success and failure of post-communist revolutions

Author: Paul D'Anieri

In: Communist and Post-Communist Studies, Vol 39, No 3 (Special Issue ‘Democratic Revolutions in Post-Communist States’, ed. Taras Kuzio), 2006, pp. 331-350

Argues that while most studies focus on grassroots movements, elites – especially security services – are crucial in determining whether movements reach a ‘tipping point’. Illustrates argument by comparing two ‘failed revolutions’ (Serbia 1996-97 and Ukraine 2001) with two ‘successful revolutions’ (Serbia 2000 and Ukraine 2004-2005). [Compare with Binnendijk; Marovic, Power and persuasion: Nonviolent strategies to influence state security forces in Serbia (2000) and Ukraine (2004) (D. II.1. Comparative Assessments) above.]

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Paul D'Anieri

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Serbia

Ukraine

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Volume One -> D. Resisting Authoritarianism in Post-Communist and Post-Soviet Regimes -> D. II. 'Electoral Revolutions' and 'Critical Elections' in Post-Communist States -> D. II.1. Comparative Assessments

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The online version of Vol. 1 of the bibliography was made possible due to the generous support of the International Center on Nonviolent Conflict (ICNC). ICNC is an independent, non-profit educational foundation that develops and encourages the study and use of civilian-based, nonmilitary strategies aimed at establishing and defending human rights, democratic self-rule and justice worldwide.

For more information about ICNC, please see their website.

The online version of Vol. 2 of the bibliography was made possible due to the generous support of The Network for Social Change. The Network for Social Change is a group of individuals providing funding for progressive social change, particularly in the areas of justice, peace and the environment.