E. V.C.b. Algeria

Algeria's experience of being a French colony, which was seen by the French and French settlers in the colony as being especially close to metropolitan France, resulted in a bitter war of national liberation. The French military, just defeated in the colonial war in Indo-China, tried to repress the uprising ruthlessly, including widespread use of torture. The independence struggle of 1954-62, which mobilized many sectors of Algerian society, including women, became a model for guerrilla warfare and inspired the writings of Frantz Fanon on the role of revolutionary violence. The organization that led this struggle, the FLN (National Liberation Front), became the government after the French withdrew.  After a period of military rule between 1965 and 1976, the FLN was formally restored to its leading role and remained in power until 1988.That year thousands of Algerians took to the streets in protest against their economic conditions (exacerbated by a recession) and against one-party rule. The 1988 uprising led to a new constitution and multi-party elections.  However, after the Islamic Salvation Front won the first round of elections in 1991, this precipitated an army coup in 1992, a state of emergency and a decade of brutal civil war between Islamists and the military, in which about 200,000 people died. 

President Abdelaziz Boutifleka came to power in 1999 representing the FLN, and in 2002 he responded to popular protests by amending the existing constitution. He was re-elected for a second term in 2004. The constitutional limit of two terms in office was suspended in 2008 to allow Boutfleka two further terms. When the Tunisian uprising began in December 2010 it inspired riots across Algeria against economic deprivation; several rioters were killed, hundred wounded and about 1,000 arrested. Over 30 people also tried to immolate themselves in January 2011, and six died. However, when leading civil society representatives and political figures organized a rally in Algiers to demand fundamental political change, only a few thousand attended. People were perhaps deterred by the military show of strength with riot police and helicopters in the capital, and impeded by controls over transport into the city. Algeria was still under a state of emergency which had existed for 19 years. There were further significant protests within various sectors of the economy and society in 2011, including sit-in strikes by students and teachers and a hunger strike by gas production workers, but they did not directly threaten the regime. The government tried with apparent success to buy off major political dissent through subsidies on basic consumer goods, and raised the salaries of civil servants.  To damp d own popular unrest Boutifleka also promised to amend the constitution. Commentators argued that fear of civil war (exacerbated by events in Libya) was also a major factor that deterred people from trying to overthrow the regime.                               

The widespread popular protests and strikes that began in February 2019 and led to a mass movement were unexpected. One cause was the worsening economic and social conditions of most Algerians. Algeria is rich in oil and gas, much of which has been exported, but the regime had notably failed to use this wealth to diversify the economy, reduce reliance on imports or improve the lot of most of the people. Instead, an economic and military elite linked to the political regime have been enriched. But even the wealth accruing from oil and gas has declined, and the government in 2019 could no longer resort to financial handouts to stave off political demands. Secondly, since 2011 the political facade for the controlling elite had become increasingly illegitimate. Boutifleka suffered a serious stroke in 2013, shortly before he was re-elected to a fourth term as president, and had been ailing since with many of his duties performed by the head of the upper house of parliament. Secondly, in 2016 a further constitutional amendment yet again formally suspended the two-term limit on the presidency. 

Therefore, the prospect in 2019 of a fifth term for an incapacitated figurehead president was insulting, and prompted mass rejection of the proposed April presidential election and Boutifleka's candidacy. The movement prevented the April election and could also claim that it forced Boutifleka to stand down. But the military stepped in to take control, and the chief of staff, General Ahmed Gaid Salah, pressurized Boutifleka to go. Salah continued to play a leading role in politics, ensuring arrests of many prominent activists, until his sudden death in December 2019.

The mass movement (the 'Hirak') also prevented a new presidential election in July, maintaining its demand that the existing political elite step down and there should be a fundamental political change.  But the presidential election was finally held in December 2019, in the context of widespread arrests of protesters, and was only contested by a number of representatives of the old regime. Abdelmadjid Tebboune, a former prime minister backed by General Salah, was elected. The Hirak boycotted the election. Tebboune sought legitimacy by promising constitutional change during the election, and after a period allowing for public debate a referendum was held on proposed constitutional amendments in November 2020. The Hirak refused to take part in prior discussions or in the vote, both because of the timing during the Covid-19 pandemic and its associated restrictions, and because they viewed the process with distrust. The amendments in fact increased the president's already considerable powers in relation to the political and judicial processes, although they reinstated the two-term presidency limit. Under 24 per cent of the electorate voted, the lowest poll in independent Algeria's history, but the amendments passed with a 67 per cent yes vote.

The movement continued to maintain its weekly protests demanding fundamental political change up to March 2020.  Then the Covid-19 pandemic provided the regime with the opportunity to prevent all travel, forbid all public gatherings and marches and impose severe penalties on those who defied the ruling.  The regime also arrested journalists supportive of the Hirak and tried to shut down parts of social media. The movement responded to Covid largely by converting itself into civic networks to provide medical assistance, food distribution and other forms of practical aid to the population.  But it still claimed to be ready to resume regular protests for fundamental change.

Commentators agree that the Hirak has proved to be an impressive mass movement, staging a general strike in its early weeks, and maintaining weekly Friday demonstrations, supplemented by weekly student protests on Tuesdays, for over a year until suspended by the Covid pandemic and official restrictions. It has also managed to unite a very wide range of the population. Whilst the young have been at the forefront - young workers and the unemployed as well as students - veterans of the war of liberation have given support. Official trade unions tend to support the regime - although members of the General Union of Algerian Workers managed to force a change of leadership in 2019 they did not achieve a change of policy. But unofficial unions have participated to some extent, and many professional associations including those in health and education, have joined in, as have members of the judiciary. The movement has also united Arabs and Berbers. There is general agreement that women, despite their inferior legal status and social conventions discriminating against them, have often been to the fore in demonstrations and played a significant role. The Hirak has also maintained a strong emphasis on remaining a nonviolent resistance movement, avoiding provocation that could 'justify' the military opening fire on demonstrators. Like many other popular uprisings today, it is also highly decentralized, accommodating diverse ideological strands (Islamists and liberals), and organized horizontally with the help of social media. The absence of any central political leadership is seen by many commentators as a problem for developing a strategy to achieve the movement's goals, as some of the references below indicate.