E. V.A.2. Lebanon

The mass political movement that erupted in October 2019 had been preceded by earlier protests against failure of basic public services such as water and electricity supply and in reaction to the increasingly dire economic conditions in Lebanon.  A prolonged breakdown in rubbish collection in the summer of 2015 prompted demonstrations against the political system, and led to some groups promoting independent candidates in the 2016 municipal elections and the parliamentary elections in 2018. The October 2019 uprising was also preceded by a series of strikes by trade unionists and demonstrations by military veterans in April and May 2019, against proposed cuts in the salaries of government workers and in military pensions. But the October protests were on a different scale: an estimated two million demonstrators out of a population of 4.8 million. The movement was predominantly young, but included all age groups, transcended the usual class and religious divides, and was actively promoted by women as well as men. Despite rioting on the eve of the major protests in October 2019, and frequent violence by the security forces against protesters,  the movement has been primarily an expression of nonviolent civil resistance.  The protests were sparked by the dire economic situation and the government's attempts to meet the crisis through new taxes and austerity measures, but soon extended to challenge the banking system. 

Protesters also opposed the existing political system, based on the principle of power-sharing between the Christian, Shia and Sunni political groups.  The top political roles of president, prime minister and parliamentary speaker were divided between the three. Power-sharing was designed to overcome the sectarian tensions that led to the bitter civil war of 1975-90, and was the outcome of negotiations to end the war. But although it operated within a parliamentary context with regular elections, the sectarian parties operated through patronage; so administrative positions were not based on ability but distributed to meet sectarian quotas. Power also remained primarily in the hands of  key individuals, who in many cases had become prominent during the civil war; for example President Michael Aoun had been a general in the war.  It was generally recognized that the whole system was deeply corrupt, with the most powerful plundering state funds.

The October 2019 movement secured a rapid response from Prime Minister Saad Hariri, who had sponsored the emergency economic measures and who resigned at the end of October. After President Aoun had conducted prolonged negotiations, former education minister, Hassan Diab was appointed on 19 December as the new Prime Minister to head a technocratic government. He was rejected by the protesters demanding  a new kind of  politics. The more left wing sections of the movement, such as the Communist Party, the Popular Nasserist Organization and Youth for Change, also strongly criticized neoliberal economic theory and privatization as a solution to economic crisis.

Lebanon's political problems have been intensified by the intervention of other Middle Eastern states. Armed conflict between Israel and Palestinian militants based in Lebanon had led to partial Israeli military occupation (as in 1982), a war with Israel in 2006, and more temporary military incursions into Lebanon.  But systematic attempts to control Lebanon's internal politics have come from Syria (as dramatized by the Cedar Revolution of 2005 - see above), and from  Iran (exercised mainly through the powerful movement Hizbollah).  Since Syria became engulfed in its long-running civil war from 2012, Lebanon has provided refuge for up to one and a half million Syrian refugees, who added to the pressure on its resources and struggling public services.

The Lebanese economy has long been precarious and deeply in debt, and up to 400,000 Lebanese migrated to jobs in the Gulf states.  Their remittances home provided up to a fifth of Lebanon's GDP.  But from 2017 external economic and political change combined to worsen Lebanon's  position. A drop in the price of oil, which impacted on Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states, led to a fall in expatriate remittances back to Lebanon; Saudi Arabia is also planning to dispense with foreign workers. The Trump presidency in the US also undermined the Lebanese government, cutting by half its annual $200 million in military aid which financed weapon procurement from the US and  military training.

Given the multiplicity of Lebanon's problems there were obvious questions about the ability of the October 2019 movement, despite its impressive scale, inventiveness and  determination, to bring about any major political reforms. It was most unlikely that there would be a sufficiently constructive response from within the existing political system, and the movement lacked a clear united leadership or programme. The difficulties facing the movement were intensified in 2020 by the impact of the Covid-19 virus and by spiralling economic decline, with the Lebanese pound falling sharply in value. Then an explosion, on August 4 2020, of 2,750 tons of ammonium nitrate (used for fertilizer and  explosives) stored in the port of Beirut, killed over 200 people, injured about 5, 000, and caused enormous damage not only to the port but to much of the city centre, including the hospitals full of Covid patients, which then received many of those hurt by the blast. The explosion dramatized the total irresponsibility of  the regime - the highly dangerous nitrate had  been stored in the port for six years since it was unloaded from a Russian tanker. It prompted  a large angry demonstration against the authorities and further protests by those backing  the October 2019 movement.  It also led a week later to the resignation of Prime Minister Diab, who declared the explosion was the result of endemic corruption.

In the immediate aftermath of the explosion the October movement was revitalized by hopes for major political change,  President Macron of France also visited Lebanon to offer substantial aid, provided there were guarantees it would not be siphoned off corruptly.  However, by October 2020 the public mood had turned to despair, with many trying to emigrate or risking death to reach Europe illegally. 

On the anniversary of the explosion on 4 August 2021 press assessments conveyed an even direr picture. The investigation into the causes of the blast had still not reported and so nobody had been held accountable.  Lebanese politicians had failed for a year to form a government, which meant that offers of foreign aid conditional on political reform had not been received. The economy, undermined by the engrained political corruption, was in dire straits with spiraling inflation for food and  other basic necessities, widespread unemployment and  poverty, shortages of medicines, erratic power supplies and a rapidly depreciating currency. There were some angry demonstrations about the failure to hold anybody accountable for the blast, or to reform and rebuild after it. But most people were just trying to survive or to leave the country.