

**Human security- providing
protection without sticks and
carrots?**

Christine Schweitzer

*Unarmed Resistance:
the transnational factor
13-17 July 2006*



Centre For Peace and Reconciliation Studies

Please do not reproduce without permission.

Human security- providing protection without sticks and carrots?

**Centre For Peace and Reconciliation
Studies
Coventry University**

International Seminar.

**Unarmed Resistance: The
Transnational Factor**

13-17 July 2006

**Human security- providing protection without
sticks and carrots?**

Christine Schweitzer



Please do not reproduce without permission.

1. Introduction

Nonviolent intervention is a very broad field with more approaches and strategies than can possibly be counted. An exhaustive overview over it like Gene Sharp (1973) provided it for nonviolent action has yet to be written. This article here will focus on only one sector of nonviolent intervention that can be called nonviolent peace-keeping if using the terminology of the three peace strategies as introduced by Johan Galtung (1976), and since then have been refined by other authors such as the social anthropologist Stephen Ryan (1995). By definition, peacekeeping is about keeping the opponents apart and aiming at preventing or at least lowering the level of violence.¹

While military peace-keeping usually focuses on keeping warring armies apart and preventing them from continuing the fight, the kind of violence missions of unarmed peace-keeping are dealing with is mostly targeted assassination of individuals, for example human rights defenders or protagonists of NGOs and community-based organisations (CBOs), or the protection of communities or groups like refugees returning home.² Nonviolent peace-keeping can be used to support those who struggle for changing their society (nonviolent struggle) or for maintaining their own way of life (nonviolent or social defence), by protecting them and by maintaining open some space for their struggle. This is where nonviolent peacekeeping becomes a transnational factor in unarmed resistance. Sometimes the term ‘protective accompaniment’ is used as a generic term to describe these activities.³ Others in the tradition of nonviolence trainer George Lakey use the terms presence, accompaniment, monitoring and interpositioning to describe what they see as the four main activities.⁴ Internal assessments of the range of activities the INGO Nonviolent Peaceforce is undertaking in Sri Lanka under the umbrella of ‘nonviolent peace-keeping’ originated a much larger list of activities than only four.⁵

A special case of nonviolent intervention are those where the aggressor is the home country of those intervening nonviolently, like it were the USA in the work of the US-American Witness for Peace going to Nicaragua to prevent a military attack, and coupling their presence on the ground with advocacy work ‘back home’.⁶ In such situations other factors start playing a role that deserve a study of its own and are not considered in this article, though they are very important in the context of international support for unarmed resistance.

1 Miall/Ramsbotham/Woodhouse 1999:22

2 The goal to develop unarmed peace-keeping so that it could fulfil the same function as military peace-keeping is often present with those involved in this kind of activities. Moser-Puangsuwan and Weber (2000) speak of a “recurrent vision” of making peace by interpositioning, though a vision that so far has very rarely been realized. There are a few examples of larger-scale unarmed missions, and currently at least one international NGO (Nonviolent Peaceforce, but there have been many others before) who strive to achieve this goal.

3 “International protective accompaniment is the physical accompaniment by international personnel of activists, organizations or communities threatened with politically motivated attacks.” (Mahony 2004:6)

4 Lakey, George, “How to Develop Peace Teams – ‘The Lightbulb Theory’”, Manuscript, published by Training for Change, no date

5 Furnari 2006

6 See Griffin-Nolan 2000

Studies especially interested in nonviolent intervention have paid a certain amount of attention to approaches to nonviolent peacekeeping.⁷ In addition a number of case studies has been published.⁸ Most of these studies however are more of a descriptive kind – astonishingly little has been done about putting this approach (or approaches) of nonviolent peacekeeping into a theoretical framework. The one important and with insiders well-known exception is the study by Mahony and Eguren (1997) on protective accompaniment as practiced by Peace Brigades International. The two authors develop a theory of nonviolent deterrence as explanation of the mechanisms of why protective accompaniment ‘works’ or does not ‘work’ depending on certain variables that have to be present. This explanation of how unarmed protection has been widely accepted by the practitioners in this field and is often seen as the only mechanism existing.

This article intends to look at the strategies of nonviolent peace-keeping, will ask using the example of two NGOs with whom the author is familiar if ‘deterrence’ is the only mechanism that is being applied, or how ‘it is working’, and will suggest to put different approaches into a framework of an escalation of conflict without arms.

The theory of nonviolent deterrence

Mahony and Eguren 1997 and Mahony 2004 are describing a theory of deterrence without threat of arms. It is a deterrence based on the concern a conflict party has for its international image: *“International accompaniment can succeed in deterring attacks because the decision makers behind these attacks seldom want a bad international image. They don’t want the world to know about what they are doing. They don’t want diplomats making them uncomfortable mentioning human rights problems in their meetings. They don’t want to read in the international press that they are being called monsters or criminals. They will avoid all that if they can.”* (Mahony 2004:7)

They describe the protective effect of international presence is one of an indirect threat – the threat with an international reaction in case an attack or human rights violation occurs in the presence of the international monitor / accompanier, thereby increasing the political cost.

But it does not only affect the decision-makers – those at the top of the line of command – but also the individual perpetrator: *“We should not assume that the thugs who pull the trigger are unaffected by international presence. No one wants an unexpected witness around when they are carrying out a crime. The volunteer’s presence may have a moral influence on individual perpetrators. It also introduces an uncertainty factor—the attacker does not know what the consequences of this witness will be, so unless he has explicit orders that take the accompaniment into account, he is likely to restrain himself rather than risk getting in trouble with his superior.”* (Mahony 2004:8)

According to Mahony (2004:18pp) a series of conditions must be met in order to this deterrence to ‘work’:

7 Schirch 1995, Muller 1995, Mahony/Eguren 1997, Moser-Puangsuwan/ Weber (eds) 2000, Schweitzer et al 2001 and Tullio (ed) 2002 can be named as examples.

8 Coy 1997 on Peace Brigades International, Müller 2004 on Balkan Peace Team, Dudouet 2005 and others.

Human security- providing protection without sticks and carrots?

1. There must be a clear source of the threat.
2. The perpetrator has to be sensitive to international pressure, and the accompaniers have to gauge how much sensitivity there is. The assumption of this theory is that the perpetrator makes an assessment of costs and benefits and then decides that the perceived costs are higher than the benefits.
3. The organisation has to have the leverage to exert pressure, which is achieved by making itself known to all levels of the military and civilian authorities, and through a global emergency alert network adding grassroots' pressure.
4. The abusing party must know of the presence of the accompaniers and their power.
5. The accompaniment and the activist have to communicate clearly to the aggressor what types of actions are unacceptable.
6. The aggressor must believe that an organisation is capable of carrying out its resolution.

Accompaniment or nonviolent peace-keeping alters the political space local activists have. Mahony and Eguren describe quite in detail the problems going with widening space because there is may be a difference between perceived and real space. So in the worst case the presence of internationals may also cause a false perception of space that is not really there, thereby making people take risks they should have better not taken. Deterrence fails when the aggressor decides that the attack is worth it, because other benefits outweigh the political costs. *"All that is left is to apply the threatened consequences as firmly as possible after the attack, in the hope of changing the calculation next time around."* (Mahony/Eguren 1997:162)

There have been concerns raised about the ethical side of this approach:

1. This threat only works usually if it relies heavily on Europeans and North Americans because these are the countries able to provide pressure. That means that the tactic is using existing power imbalances, neo-colonial dependencies and often also racist attitudes to provide protection.⁹
2. International pressure may sometimes be a vague notion, but sometimes it may mean a very concrete threat like the one of military intervention (example would be the Kosovo Verification Mission in Kosovo-an unarmed large-scale mission but coming under the 'protection' of a threat with NATO intervention). What kind of pressure will be exercised is usually out of the hands of the nonviolent projects.

Nevertheless, most nonviolent activists at least from the West feel that the advantages, namely giving concrete protection to people under threat, outweighs these concerns.

As remarked in the introduction, the theory of nonviolent deterrence is often considered as the and only mechanism of how protective accompaniment or nonviolent peacekeeping achieve effect. To explore this notion further, another concept, human security, and its strategies will be discussed next.

⁹ Ed Kinane summarises this function in his description of "Cry for Justice": "Cry for Justice, like PBI and other accompaniment groups, ran on WSP-white skin privilege. We volunteers were super-citizens. The vast majority of Haitian citizens were and are sub-citizens." (Kinane 2000:214)

Unarmed Approaches to Human Security

“Human security refers to freedom for individuals from basic insecurities caused by gross human rights violations” (A Human Security Doctrine for Europe, 2004, Executive Summary), and distinguishes it from state security.¹⁰ Human security has been widening the understanding of security to include other threats than those from an invading army. It *“includes protection of citizens from environmental pollution, transnational terrorism, massive population movements, such infectious diseases as HIV/AIDs and long-term conditions of oppression and deprivation”*. (Human Security Now 2003:6)

The concept has been originated within the United Nations in the last six years. In response to General-Secretary Kofi Annan raising the question humanitarian intervention in the General Assembly of the UN in 1999 and 2000, asking how the international community could respond to “gross and systematic violations of human rights” like in Rwanda or Srebrenica.¹¹, an independent international commission was set up that produced the report “The Responsibility to Protect” in 2001. This report speaks of the responsibility of modern states to respond to human rights abuses and puts this responsibility over the international law provision of non-interference in ‘internal affairs’ of other countries. Several later government reports, studies and papers published by NGOs have expanded on this theme and outlined the concept of human security¹², and also the civilian UN agencies dealing with such issues (UNICEF, UNHCR for example) have adopted the concept in their policies.¹³

10 A human Security Doctrine for Europe a.a.o, p. 9, Human Security Now 2003:1 pp

11 See Abbott 2005:7

12 For example Human Security Now 2003, Refugees International 2003, A Human Security Doctrine for Europe 2004, Slim/Eguren 2004, Human Security Report 2005

13 There are both positive and negative elements to the concept of human security when seen with the eyes of a nonviolent activist. On the one hand the governments and international organisations discuss enforcement of human security by military means – in that regard the concept looks like just a new term or new justification for what became coined at the beginning of the 1990s as “humanitarian intervention”. (See as three examples of a discussion with probably thousands of contributions Lewer /Ramsbotham 1993, the articles in Siani-Davies (ed) 2003 and Abbott 2005) The widening of the security concept has been the basis the new security concept by NATO and many individual states after the end of the Cold War that now plan for using military means for protection against other threats than purely traditional military ones – from terrorism to fending of mass movements of refugees.(Alliances's Strategic Concept, Approved by the Heads of State and Government participating in the meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Washington D.C. on 23rd and 24th April 1999)

On the other side the concept listing long-term conditions of oppression and deprivation and naming the protection of human rights (see Human Security Now 2003:10) as objective could be related to Galtung’s “structural violence”, it acknowledges the role civil society plays for providing security (Human Security Now 2003:6), and it allows to put a focus on violent situations short of full war – situations like in Guatemala, Colombia or Sri Lanka with high numbers of political killings without open war being declared. This multidimensional widening makes it also easier for NGOs concerned with providing protection to link their work to central tasks identified by the international community. Examples besides those presented below would be groups like Peace Brigades International, Witness for Peace, the International Solidarity Movement, Christian Peacemaker Teams and several others who seek to protect human rights defenders by acting as their un-armed bodyguards in several Latin American countries, provide presence in threatened communities or during public events to deter violence from police, military or paramilitaries, or even interposition themselves physically in situations of threatening violence to keep for example peasants during olive harvest from settlers trying to attack them like in Palestine.

Human security- providing protection without sticks and carrots?

Looking at how NGOs provide human security, Slim/Eguren ¹⁴ distinguish five main modes of action as they all it:

- “1. Denunciation is pressuring authorities through public disclosure into meeting their obligations and protecting individuals or groups exposed to abuse.*
- 2. Persuasion is convincing the authorities through further private dialogue to fulfil their obligations and to protect individuals and groups exposed to violations.*
- 3. Mobilisation is sharing information in a discreet way with selected people, bodies or states that have the capacity to influence the authorities to satisfy their obligations and to protect individuals and groups exposed to violations.*
- 4. Substitution is directly providing services or material assistance to the victims of violations.*
- 5. Support to structures and services is empowering existing national and/or local structures through project-orientated aid to enable them to carry out their functions to protect individuals and groups.” (Slim/Eguren 2004: 27)*

These five they say can put a stop to violations, punish the perpetrators, prevent violations or limit their effect. Methods used include humanitarian assistance, presence and accompaniment, monitoring and human rights reporting, and humanitarian advocacy. ¹⁵

At least four of these five ‘modes of action’ have direct reference to our topic here, namely the goal to open space and give protection to civil society in resistance. Only substitution seems not to fit well here. And we find here again the strategy of deterrence when authorities are being pressured to act through denunciation but also two clearly different other mechanisms: persuasion defined as making authorities to act at their own accord, and substitution defined as the NGO acting in place of the authorities.

In the Nonviolent Peaceforce Feasibility study (Schweitzer et al 2001) we already came on the basis of reading up many examples of peace teams, civil peace services, larger-scale unarmed monitoring missions as well as military peace-keeping to the conclusion that there were alternative sources of protection than deterrence:

- *“Identity. Factors here might be age, gender, and country of origin, religion and others.*
- *Role (peacekeeper), and whom you represent (e.g. the UN). This has become important in international missions when members of those missions would probably not have been respected because of their identity alone.*
- *Law and tradition (For example rules against harming unarmed opponents, rules of hospitality).*
- *Communication: making oneself known and trusted by creating personal relationships, using rational argument and moral appeal, or setting examples, by*

14 Adapting a source from Bonard, P., *Modes of Action Used by Humanitarian Players*, Geneva: ICRC, 1999

15 Any single activity may work in more than one of these modes of action. To give one example: *“Thus, a humanitarian presence can sometimes be an effective form of humanitarian protection in itself, as a vital aspect of persuasion and mobilisation or as a prerequisite for effective and credible denunciation.” (Slim/ Eguren 2004:42)*

displaying a behaviour different from usual (e.g. working in teams whose members come from nations known as enemies of each other.” (Chapter 2, Summary)

Before pursuing the issue of different strategies further, in the next step this article will look at the example of the work of two INGOs active in the field of nonviolent peace-keeping or provision of human security: Nonviolent Peaceforce and Balkan Peace Team.

2. Nonviolent Peaceforce in Sri Lanka

Nonviolent Peaceforce (NP) is a young international NGO founded with the goal to develop unarmed peacekeeping to a level where it can compete with military peacekeeping in the sense of having direct impact through the presence of large numbers of nonviolent field team members as NP's field staff is called on an armed conflict as such.¹⁶

NP launched its first project in Sri Lanka in late 2003 at the invitation of and in partnership with local groups. NP in Sri Lanka (NPSL) consist of a headquarters in Colombo and five teams of altogether ca. 20-25 internationally recruited field team members (in their majority from countries from the Global South), applying unarmed peacekeeping methods such as protective accompaniment, mediation, observing and reporting in volatile areas in the North and East of Sri Lanka. Their objectives are to reduce the level, *and potential for, and prevent violence; support and improve the safety, confidence and ability of Sri Lankan peacemakers and other civilians to address conflict in non-violent ways; and work with Sri Lankans to provide human security and deter resumption of violent conflict in partnership with Sri Lankans.*

Primary partners and beneficiaries of NPSL's work are community-based organisations working to prevent violence and protect human rights on the ground. In addition NP has entered into agreements with national NGOs to assist with election monitoring, accompaniment and the creation of a Shanti Sena (Peace Army). NPSL is also partnering and working with international NGOs and a UN agency. It has played key roles in resolving disputes among ethnic and other groups, securing the release of child soldiers, providing protective presence in IDP camps and at temple festivals and monitoring the delivery of aid to Tsunami affected areas accompanying local aid workers who are under threat an certain areas.

During the by now three years of NP's presence in Sri Lanka many internal reports, the result of internal monitoring and self-reporting of the field teams have been collected.¹⁷ Unfortunately most of these reports are not public- one exception is the article by Ellen Furnari (2006).

¹⁶ NP is a federation or organisation of about 95 member organisations (mostly groups with an explicit nonviolent action or resistance background) from all continents. It is led by an elected council of 18 members, and has aside from the field staff in Sri Lanka about 30 staff in the US, Europe, India and Uganda.

¹⁷ The author as Programme Director of NP has access to these reports. In particular used for this article have been.

o Notes From the Review Workshop of the Sri Lanka Project, Conducted by the

Human security- providing protection without sticks and carrots?

The first field team members were trained in the approach and terminology of George Lakey teaching them that there were four methods of nonviolent peacekeeping – accompaniment, presence, monitoring and interpositioning of which they were to apply the first three. When arriving in Sri Lanka it however became clear very quickly that this did not match the reality of the activities they were doing.

Ellen Furnari (2006) summarizing the different reports states that

“Specific methods and activities have included:

- *connecting people to resources*
- *linking CBOs with national NGOs and IOs*
- *Facilitating people to connect with local leaders / authorities*
- *networking CBOs in different places with each other, making them known to other people*
- *accompanying activists or other threatened people*
- *providing transportation when appropriate for peace work, crises management or protection*
- *presence at events or places at risk*
- *facilitation within or between communities including mediation and/or building bridges over communication and community barriers*
- *documentation of threats to human rights and/or violence*
- *support of local groups and individuals including accompanying local NGO workers as requested*
- *documentation, monitoring and fact finding that contributes to rumour control or supports non-violent problem solving*
- *visiting and listening*
- *consulting with local activists and people in general on options of what to do in crisis*
- *supporting the development of the Rapid Deployment Peace Brigade of Sarvodaya*
- *providing safe places to meet*
- *introducing INGOs and IOs to areas that are difficult, remote or familiar to NP*
- *helping build nonviolent alternatives*
- *supporting early warning efforts*
- *supporting new, emerging leaders working for nonviolent solutions to individual and community problems*

Program Committee of NP, 17 - 21 May, 2005, Colombo, taken by Christine Schweitzer (internal document)

- Sri Lanka Project Quarterly Report no 1, submitted by Program Committee, covering June-August 2004 (internal document)
 - Sri Lanka Quarterly Volume 1, no 4, submitted by Programme Committee, Covering April - June 2005 (internal document)
 - Sri Lanka Quarterly Volume 1, no 5, submitted by Programme Committee, Covering July - September 2005 (internal document)
 - Sri Lanka Quarterly Volume 1, no 6, submitted by Programme Committee, Covering: October 2005 – March 2006 (internal document)
- Sri Lanka Volume 1, nos. 2 & 3, submitted by Program Committee [covering September 2004-March 2005] (internal document)

Human security- providing protection without sticks and carrots?

- *training in nonviolence and nonviolent methods and sharing inspiration and experiences of peace and human rights work from different parts of the world or Sri Lanka*
- *supporting free and fair elections through our work with PAFFREL*
- *being a trusted partner to think and plan with on difficult issues or in a crises.”*

When looking at this list and reading the detailed team reports then it is pretty obvious that a major element of the work aside from accompaniment, presence and monitoring is linking people to authorities or agencies, to some extent training, and a lot about supporting meetings and dialogue at the community level. Neither of the last three would fall under ‘peace-keeping’ if that were defined as a dissociative approach. But since the goal of most of these activities has been to increase people’s well-being by helping them to get access to aid, or solving conflicts that otherwise would probably lead to communal violence and killings, and helping civil society groups to come together to develop their own activities against violence and human rights violations, they are part of a strategy to provide human security.

When comparing this inductive list of activities with the five modes of action of Slim and Eguren, it quickly becomes obvious that they match pretty well; only ‘substitution’ is missing.

NP does not only have no means of enforcement as ‘robust’ peacekeepers do, it also does not have ‘carrots’ in forms of humanitarian aid. This has meant often a lot of explanation and also at least at first disappointed expectations by local people who associate INGOs with aid. NP found that it needed a lot of time to explain its particular approach of “nonviolent peacekeeping”, and finding and building trust.

Until recently, if asked what NP’s source for security of its own staff was the answer would have been: ‘to be known and trusted by the local community’. So the impact has depended on personal relations: “...*our relationships deepen as trust builds over time and as our own understanding of situations matures, we are able to have more impact.*”¹⁸

While NP started to build up an Emergency Response Network following the example of PBI, this network until today has by far not achieved the same efficiency as PBI’s network has. The first 2,5 years of the work in Sri Lanka it was never used, and when it was used for the first two times in early 2006, the response rate was rather low and disappointing. Probably everyone in NP would agree that NP falls short of having the kind of international clout needed in the eyes of PBI to achieve protection for its staff and those it works for.

Nevertheless, NP has been a protection in many cases. The teams have done countless numbers of accompaniments of local activists and aid workers, mediated in community conflicts, and coordinated and carried out presence at events where abductions of children to make them soldiers was feared.

In May 2006 however NP and some other INGOs came under direct attack by unknown perpetrators, having a grenade being exploded in front of their office and wounding one of its international staff. While not knowing for sure, the assumption is that NP's non-partisan approach that has led it to provide accompaniment and support to all sides in the multiple-sided conflicts of that area of Sri Lanka has become a threat to one or the other of these sides. The trust that NP had built in the community had not been sufficient to protect it from the attack (though of course the perpetrators themselves may have come from outside the community). At this point NP then started to engage more forcefully than before in the strategy of nonviolent deterrence, using its contacts to officials, international agencies, embassies and so on to develop international clout.

3. Balkan Peace Team

The Balkan Peace Team (BPT) has been an international volunteer project working in Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia between 1994 and 2001.¹⁹ Its mandate was broader than those of PBI or NP although it shared with those two the goal of opening space for local actors rather than being one of the countless NGOs in the area following their own agendas and doing their own externally-planned projects. Protection and support of dialogue were its two focuses, with protection being more important in Croatia, and the support of dialogue at the civil society level among activists from Serbia and Kosovo.²⁰ Many activities of BPT in Croatia had to do with human security (though that term was unknown then). The teams accompanied local human rights activists on many of their missions, be it to prevent the illegal eviction of people of the wrong ethnicity from their flats, or monitoring the situation in newly reintegrated Croatian Krajina after 1995. In the Krajina this international presence was intended to deter harassment and worse (arson, killings) of those Serbs who remained behind after the reoccupation, and all internal assessments as well as the study by Müller done later on the project confirm that the presence made a difference at those places they regularly went.

BPT was an experiment in combining several roles that other projects tended to keep apart. Unlike many peace-building projects, it focused on human security/protection (civil peacekeeping) without rigidly limiting its role to this one aspect. And unlike Peace Brigades International or some peace teams in the realm of civilian protection, it allowed itself to get involved in a large variety of peace-building activities without feeling that doing so it would lose its character or endanger its non-partisanship.

The ways in which BPT made a difference included:

- Serving a *preventive* function in regard to potential human rights violations.

19 The Balkan Peace Team was founded and run by a group of mainly European-based peace organisations, from Austria, France, Germany, the Netherlands, Switzerland and the UK. They included Austrian Peace Service, International Fellowship of Reconciliation, Peace Brigades International and War Resisters' International, Federation for Social Defence (Germany), Brethren Service (US), Peace Brigades International, and MAN-Mouvement pour une alternative nonviolente (France). Its tightly-run coordinating office was based in Germany.

20 See Müller 2004, Schweitzer /Clark 2002, Schweitzer 2005

Human security- providing protection without sticks and carrots?

- Fulfilling a *mediating* role between local NGOs and international organizations or NGOs. In Croatia, BPT teams were often called upon because, as an international NGO, it had easier access to other “internationals” than local activists. Unfortunately, this was not only a question of language, but also whether internationals were prepared to take local groups seriously.
- Serving as a *bridge* between local NGOs or private citizens and local authorities in the same way as NP does in Sri Lanka.
- Facilitating *contact* between NGOs from “different sides”. As internationals, BPT had more freedom of movement between the conflict areas than local NGOs – between Croatia and Krajina, between Serbia and Kosovo, between Croatia and FR Yugoslavia.
- This placed the organization in the position to *support dialogue* between organizations, and eventually to arrange meetings. The meetings between Serbian and Kosovan students and activists BPT mediated have had a very different character from other dialogue meetings because they did not happen in a place abroad (as most dialogue projects prefer), but they accompanied people visiting each other in their towns which gave the participants a much bigger feeling of ownership over the meeting than any international workshop can do.
- Carrying out an active *advocacy role*. BPT alerted other international organizations about, for example, the policy of Croatia regarding refugees from Bosnia (especially Bihac); the sometimes less-than-helpful role UNPROFOR played in Croatia; the situation in the Krajina and Eastern Slavonia; the situation in Kosovo after the war 1999 when local experts were snapped up by international organizations which were able to pay them much better.

These different functions BPT was able to play because it was an international project. And in many instances its effectiveness probably can be explained by the deterrence theory. But there is one important modification: The former Yugoslavia was an arena with a multitude of international interveners, many and the most conspicuous of them being backed by military force though until 1995 of a limited sort and not being entitled to enforce its protective mandate. BPT made a point of distancing itself from the interventions of the international community but on the symbolic level (not using the fancy white cars the UN and EU observers drove around with) and on the practical by seeking dialogue rather than invoking the threat of international power. So while it certainly profited from this power its approach was different from PBI's, and the sources of its influence almost rather being different from the rest of the international community than having that sort of clout.

4. Additional examples and discussions

Before trying a summary, a few additional examples and aspects will be mentioned below.

1. There are and have been many other peace teams and comparable projects. While varying in mandate and practices, one will when looking at their work

Human security- providing protection without sticks and carrots?

will notice that most of them display the same mixture of ways of achieving their objectives.²¹

2. Peacekeeping is not always done by internationals. There are a much larger number of local or national initiatives engaging in the same effort than is often recognized in international literature. The probably best-known example are the Pakistani and Indian 'peace armies' as developed by Abdul Ghaffar Khan and Gandhi, and a number of local peace teams or peace monitoring missions that can be found in such different countries as Croatia, Indonesia, Philippines, Sri Lanka and of course India today.²² Their effectiveness is probably mainly derived from respect in the community, being centred inwards, not outwards to the international world. The focus of the Indian Shanti Sena is and was on convincing those ready to apply violence, and to strengthen the communities to resist that violence, using methods of dialogue, counteracting rumours, physical interpositioning and aid and reconstruction.²³
3. A relationship of a two-layered protection scheme has been sketched in NP's work to develop a project in Mindanao, Philippines. While so far no permanent presence has been implemented²⁴, exploratory visits and discussions with local activists outlined a system that some from within NP who are solely familiar with PBI's deterrence strategy found difficult to understand and accept. This system in a nutshell is that the local communities would look after the international field team members, making sure that they would not fall victim to kidnapping or violence, while the internationals would carry with them the 'international eye', being witnesses from the outside.
4. As already mentioned in the introduction, a special case are probably those peace team projects that come from the country / group of those from whom the threat of violence derives. The most famous are the US-American Witness for Peace whose work combining physical presence and interpositioning in Nicaragua in the 1980s when a military attack by the United States seemed imminent with political advocacy and protest back at home. They certainly apply 'deterrence' but with quite another argument: Not the international community that is watching but the dilemma they cause their government when it would while carrying out an attack find itself killing its own citizens as well.
5. Recent and ongoing research being done on the concept of a nonviolence without deterrence or force by a group of German researchers led by Martin Arnold²⁵ suggests that there is indeed some almost universal mechanism of

21 For overviews, see Moser-Puangsuwan/Weber 2000 and Schweitzer et al 2001

22 See Büttner 1995:43 pp. and Weber 2000 for Shanti Sena. To give two further examples: There is also a Shanti Sena in Sri Lanka set up by the NGO Sarvodaya, in Eastern Croatia the Osijek Peace Center developed a mixed local-international peace team, and the Philippine NGO Bantay Ceasefire is very successfully monitoring the ceasefire between the MILF and the government in Mindanao. See www.sarvodaya.org, Culture of Peace. Centre for Peace, Non-violence and Human Rights Osijek's Publication. Osijek, 1/2001, and Bantay Ceasefire 2003, 2003 Reports of the grassroots-led missions monitoring the ceasefire between the Philippine Government (GRP) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF).

23 Weber 1996:116-117.

24 NP is still fund-raising in order to allow this project to happen.

25 See www.guetekraft.de (only in German) and a forthcoming book by Martin Arnold on some protagonists of this kind of nonviolence (2007?).

principled nonviolence taking effect by making an opponent change his/her behaviour through what they call 'guetkraft' what they see as an equivalent to 'force of love' or 'satyagraha' or many other terms in other languages describing the same kind of principled nonviolence.

6. In the Feasibility Study of Nonviolent Peaceforce the summary of a comparison of several larger-scale and mostly governmental missions of unarmed peacekeeping found that these missions all relied though to a differing degree on local people for security. *"Relying on the Bougainville people to ensure the safety of peace monitors reinforces the realisation that peace on Bougainville is the responsibility of the Bougainville people. They are only too aware that, should the safety of the PMG [Peace Monitoring Mission] be placed at risk, there is a very real danger that the peace process will falter. This was emphasised on a number of occasions when Bougainvillians assisted patrols in difficult circumstances."*²⁶ *"The decision to go to Bougainville unarmed caused some angst ... at the time, but it was the right one--there were at least two occasions I encountered which may have gone differently if we had been armed."*²⁷
7. The role of interpositioning: There are a number of nonviolent projects that has tried to enforce keeping peace and protection by interpositioning. It is true what Moser-Puangsuwan and Weber (2000) write about interpositioning conceived with the goal to stop or prevent a war has a recurrent idea but once which rarely was put into practice, and never or almost never with success. The situation is different with small initiatives like Christian Peacemaker Teams or the International Solidarity Movement in Palestine who often get actively involved in nonviolent action and interpositioning, not hesitating to take sides or to break the laws of the country in which they are working.²⁸

5. Conclusion

The examples given here demonstrate that there are other mechanisms than deterrence to provide human security. There has been a large number of activities that fell under 'modes of action' as Slim/ Eguren call it that are different from deterrence, namely under persuasion and support.

In regard to keeping opponents apart, there are obviously different approaches to achieve that. One of the major ones identified is building on trust and protection by the local community, so that attackers would refrain from action not because of fear of sanctions or repercussions from the international wider community, but from within their own community. This seems to be a mechanism working both for international and for local unarmed peacekeepers.

But this way of achieving effect seems not always to work as the example of NP showed when in spite of seemingly good relations in the community an attack was carried out against the team.

26 Quote from Major Luke Foster from the Australian Defence Force, Contribution to the Seminar Monitoring Peace in Bougainville, <http://rspas.anu.edu.au/melanesia/foster.htm>

27 Quote from Andrew Rice, Department of Defence, Contribution to the Seminar Monitoring Peace in Bougainville, <http://rspas.anu.edu.au/melanesia/rice.htm>

28 See Donna Howard in Schweitzer et al 2001, Chapter 2-Peace Teams, and the reports of the ISM on its own webpage (www.palsolidarity.org)

Therefore the idea suggests itself that there is some kind of escalation model of nonviolent intervention. This is the question that will be pursued in the last paragraphs of this article.

Nonviolent escalation in general

The usual conflict models are focussing almost exclusively on violence as the dimension against which to measure different types of activities, and rarely do recognise something like the possibility of a nonviolent conflict escalation.²⁹

In the literature on conflict action there are only a few studies dealing with this issue of escalation. The probably best known and most often referred to is Gene Sharp (1973, 2005) who categorizes nonviolent action in three groups which at the same time delineate a certain escalation of conflict:

1. Protest and persuasion
2. Non-cooperation
3. Nonviolent Intervention (by which he does **not** mean what is described here as nonviolent intervention which defines intervention as an action by an external party but generally as “methods that intervene directly to change a given situation”).

Sharp further acknowledges four ways success may be achieved: Through conversion of the opponent, through accommodation, meaning that the opponents decide to yield but without being either coerced nor converted, by nonviolent coercion taking place through shifts of social forces and power relationships, or through disintegration of the opponents system or group as extreme result of coercion.³⁰

Theodor Ebert (1981) building on Sharp’s model has defined three stages of escalation in nonviolent action; each stage has both subversive and constructive elements:

Subversive	Constructive
Protest	'functional demonstrations'
Legal non-cooperation	legal innovation of roles
Civil disobedience	civil usurpation ³¹

These escalation ladders refer to Gene Sharp’s theory of political power as being ultimately depending on consent or obedience by those ruled. The dimension on which these three steps are modelled is the degree to which those ruled withdraw their consent and stop being obedient.

One other example is John Paul Lederach (1997) who describes the process of conflict transformation as the development from a static situation with very unequal distribution of political power, and a problem that has not yet become a conflict issue,

29 For example Glasl 1990 and Fisher 1993.

30 Sharp 2005:415 pp

31 Ebert 1981b:37

to a dynamic situation with better balance of power and the possibility of dealing with the problem. This includes the conflict stages from the latency stage to the articulation of protest. To end the static situation, protest needs to be organised and articulated. When this has happens, counter power may develop. A new distribution of power is both a condition for clarifying the conflict issues, and an expression of a new relationship between the conflict parties in conflict.

The author does not know of a comparable general model for conflict intervention, but there are certainly escalation models at least implicit in different types of instruments or activities, for example regarding the use of military means or the use of coercive power in negotiations.³²

It should also be mentioned that not all nonviolent activists do agree with Sharp's model of escalation and how nonviolence achieves an impact, at least not when it comes to the issue of nonviolent coercion. Especially those who see themselves in the tradition of Gandhi argue that any kind of coercion is violence and that 'true nonviolence' always aims at converting the opponent but does not force him. The question however may be asked if this is an ethical premise or the result of a study of how nonviolent campaigns and actions (including those of Gandhi) unfold their impact. In the framework of this article this general question cannot be pursued further.³³ Instead, the question here is only if these models inform us on nonviolent intervention for providing human security or being engaged in peacekeeping.

Is there an escalation of nonviolent action to provide human security?

In the paragraph above two different if related dimensions have been identified on which theory has pictured escalation: the degree to which power or coercive force is used, and the degree to which cooperation is withdrawn.

The withdrawal of cooperation does not seem to match with the different approaches or types of action that have been described above regarding nonviolent intervention by an external or third party. While there are initiatives that use direct action in solidarity with local protesters (for example when ISM joins or even leads protesters against roadblocks of the Israeli army), it cannot be seen that this type of activity distinguishes itself in any other way from other activities, neither in its effectiveness of preventing counter-violence, nor in its effective use of power by those intervening. While when translated to economic sanctions or boycott, withdrawal of cooperation is certainly a tool in conflict intervention, it seems not a tool that nonviolent peacekeepers **on the ground** can meaningfully use.

Therefore, at least for the cases where the intervener can be identified as an external party and not as a dissenting member of the aggressors' party, it seems that the level

32 Here, most authors recognise a continuum between third-party negotiators who use considerable pressure to bring the parties in conflict to an agreement (examples: the Dayton agreement after the NATO bombing in Bosnia 1995, and the Rambouillet negotiations carried out under the threat of military intervention in Kosovo in early 1999), and third-party negotiators who act as facilitators helping the parties in conflict to find their own solution (Norway in Sri Lanka for example).

33 Some answers may Martin Arnold have who at present is studying several cases of protagonists of what he in German calls 'Guetekraft' (see www.guetekraft.de).

Human security- providing protection without sticks and carrots?

of coercion in using power³⁴ may be the more appropriate dimension against which to measure different ways of how nonviolent peace-keeping or nonviolent work for human security 'work'.

1. Protection through persuasion of those who otherwise may threaten those to be protected, and through support to structures and services.
2. Protection through sources of power internal to the society in which the conflict takes places. Here the interveners may be either locals (Shanti Sena) or internationals that wield power because they are respected and trusted in the society or by at least certain influential parts of the society. They usually have rendered services to all sides in the conflict (be it material in form of humanitarian aid like the Shanti Sena, or in form of mediation like Nonviolent Peaceforce or Balkan Peace Team).
3. Protection through mobilisation (discreet sharing of information with those who have the capacity to influence those responsible to act in the way that the intervener wants them to act).
4. Protection through shaming (public denunciation) which often goes together with the threat of undefined or vague sanctions ('the international eye') – the PBI deterrence approach.

This escalation ladder has further steps but they would hardly be considered nonviolent anymore:

5. Protection through the threat with concrete sanctions – while not being aware of a concrete example it could be imagined that there was a mission of nonviolent interveners on the ground in some place which has back-up by for example the United Nations that would declare concrete sanctions in case that mission did not succeed, like they have done it in numerous cases when military peacekeeping was failing.
6. Trying to enforce the wished behaviour through international sanctions.
7. Protection through the threat with direct enforcement – an example would be the (unarmed) Kosovo Verification Mission of the OSCE in Kosovo 1998-1999 that had the threat with a NATO intervention as back up.
8. Trying to enforce the wished behaviour through direct military action.

This article needs to end with two warnings. The first is that all this is highly speculative and based more on intuitive insights and on assumptions local partners or the interveners themselves hold than on hard-core facts. This is true for the PBI deterrence theory as for all other ways of how nonviolent intervention achieves effect.

The second is that this escalation ladder does not necessarily reflect growing effectivity. It would need much further and comparative research into projects and missions of this type of unarmed or nonviolent intervention to be able to draw conclusions on that question.

34 Power being understood as in Max Weber's definition as 'every opportunity/possibility existing within a social relationship which permits one to carry out one's own will, even against resistance, and regardless of the basis on which this opportunity rests.'

Literature

- A Human Security Doctrine for Europe. The Barcelona Report of the Study Group on Europe's Security Capabilities (2004), Barcelona
- Abbott, Chris (2005), Rights and Responsibilities. Resolving the Dilemma of Humanitarian Intervention, Manuscript, Oxford
- Büttner, Christian W. (1995), Friedensbrigaden: Zivile Konfliktbearbeitung mit gewaltfreien Methoden, Münster:Lit Verlag
- Coy, Patrick G. (1997), Protecting Human Rights: The Dynamics of International Nonviolent Accompaniment by Peace Brigades International in Sri Lanka, UMI Dissertation Services
- Dudouet, Veronique (2005), Peacemaking and Nonviolent Resistance. A Study of the Complementarity between conflict resolution processes and nonviolent intervention, with special reference to the case of Israel/Palestine,, Thesis submitted for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, University of Bradford
- Ebert, Theodor (1981), Gewaltfreier Aufstand. Alternative zum Bürgerkrieg, Waldkirchen: Waldkircher Verlagsgesellschaft
- Fisher, Ronald J. (1993), The Potential for Peacebuilding. Forging a Bridge from Peacekeeping to Peacemaking, in: Peace and Change, Vol 18/3, July 1993: 247-266
- Furnari, Ellen (2006), The Nonviolent Peaceforce in Sri Lanka. Impacts, Learning and Summary Paper, August 2003 to December 2005, manuscript
- Galtung, Johan (1976), Three approaches to peace.peacekeeping, peacemaking and peacebuilding", in: Galtung, Peace, War and Defence - Essays in Peace Research vol II, Copenhagen:Christian Ejlers, pp. 282-304
- Glasl, Friedrich (1990), Konfliktmanagement. Ein Handbuch zur Diagnose und Behandlung von Konflikten für Organisationen und Berater, Bern/Stuttgart:Haupt
- Griffin-Nolan, Ed (2000), Witness for Peace, in Moser-Puangsuwan / Weber (eds), pp 279-304
- Human Security Now (2003), Commission on Human Security, New York
- Human Security Report 2005, ed. Andrew Mack / Zoe Nielsen, Human Security Centre, Liu Institute for Global Issues at the University of British Columbia, www.humansecuritycentre.org (20.10.2005)
- Lewer, Nick/ Ramsbotham, Oliver (1993), "Something Must Be Done". Towards an ethical framework for humanitarian intervention in international social conflict, Peace Research Report No 33, University of Bradford
- Mahony, Liam (2004), Side by Side. Protecting and encouraging threatened activists with unarmed international accompaniment, ed. Center for Victims of Torture, Minneapolis
- Mahony, Liam/ Eguren, Luis Enrique (1997), Unarmed Bodyguards. International Accompaniment for the Protection of Human Rights, West Hartford:Kumarian Press
- Miall, Hugh/ Ramsbotham, Oliver/ Woodhouse, Tom (1999), Contemporary Conflict Resolution. The prevention, management and transformation of deadly conflicts, Cambridge: Polity Press
- Moser-Puangsuwan, Yeshua/ Weber, Thomas (eds) (2000), Nonviolent Intervention Across Borders. A Recurrent Vision, Honolulu: Spark M. Matsunaga Institute for Peace
- Moser-Puangsuwan, Yeshua / Weber, Thomas (2000), The Recurrent Vision and the Peace Brigade Movement, in: Moser-Puangsuwan/Weber (eds) 2000:3-14

- Müller, Barbara (2004), *Balkan Peace Team 1994-2001. Mit Freiwilligenteams im gewaltfreien Einsatz in Krisenregionen, Bildungsvereinigung Arbeit und Leben Niedersachsen: Braunschweig*
- Muller, Jean-Marie (1995), *Principes et methodes de l'intervention civile*, manuscript
- Lederach, John Paul (1997), *Building Peace. Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies*, Washington: United States Institute of Peace Press
- Refugees International, Report on 'The Power to Protect'. Using New Military Capabilities to Stop Mass Killings, by Bernath, Clifford H. / Gompert, David C., July 2003 (www.refugeesinternational.org)
- Ryan, Stephen (1995), *Ethnic Conflict and International Relations*, 2nd ed., Aldershot: Dartmouth Publishing Company Ltd
- Schirch, Lisa (1995), *Keeping the Peace. Exploring civilian alternatives in conflict prevention*, Life and Peace Institute: Uppsala
- Schweitzer, Christine et al (2001), *Nonviolent Peaceforce - Feasibility Study*, Contributions by: Donna Howard - Mareike Junge - Corey Levine - Christine Schweitzer - Carl Stieren - Tim Wallis, Hamburg/St. Paul, September 2001 (available in electronic form only: www.nonviolentpeaceforce.org/english/resources/rstudy.asp)
- Schweitzer, Christine / Clark, Howard (2002), *Balkan Peace Team - International e.V.. A Final Internal Assessment Of Its Functioning and Activities*, Balkan Peace Team/Bund für Soziale Verteidigung (eds), Minden: Bund für Soziale Verteidigung, Hintergrund- und Diskussionspapier No. 11
- Schweitzer, Christine (2005), *An Experiment at Mixing Roles: The Balkan Peace Team in Croatia and Serbia/Kosovo*", in: *People Building Peace II*, ed. European Centre for Conflict Prevention, Utrecht, pp. 369-375
- Siani-Davies, Peter (eds) (2003), *International Intervention in the Balkans since 1995*, London/New York: Routledge
- Slim, Hugo / Eguren, Luis Enrique (2004), *Humanitarian protection. A Guidance Booklet. Pilot Version*, ALNAP <http://www.alnap.org/alnappubs.html> (8.6.2006)
- Sharp, Gene (1973), *The Politics of Nonviolent Action*, Boston: Porter Sargent Publisher
- Sharp, Gene (2005), *Waging Nonviolent Struggle. 20th Century Practice and 21st Century Potential*, Boston: Extending Horizon Books/Porter Sargent Publishers
- The Responsibility to Protect - Report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty* (2001), Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada
- Tullio, Francesco (ed) (2002), *Le Organizzazioni Non Governative e la trasformazione dei conflitti. Le operazioni di pace nelle crisi internazionali. Analisi, esperienze, prospettive*, Roma: Edizioni Associate Editrice Internazionale
- Weber, Thomas (1996), *Gandhi's Peace Army: The Shanti Sena and Unarmed Peacekeeping*, Syracuse, New York: Syracuse University Press