



Explaining the success and failure of post-communist revolutions

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Argues that while most studies focus on grassroots movements, elites – especially security services – are crucial in determining whether movements reach a 'tipping point'. Illustrates argument by comparing two 'failed revolutions' (Serbia 1996-97 and Ukraine 2001) with two 'successful revolutions' (Serbia 2000 and Ukraine 2004-2005). [Compare with Binnendijk; Marovic, [Power and persuasion: Nonviolent strategies to influence state security forces in Serbia \(2000\) and Ukraine \(2004\)](#) [2] (D. II.1. Comparative Assessments [3]) above.]

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